I. INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

I
N A RECENT engineering management publication, Jelinek and Markham [9] persuasively show how policies (a nontechnological factor) impact transfer of technology and innovations as well as eventual use of these technologies. Ignoring such factors, as well as other technological and nontechnological factors have accounted for the acutely poor telecommunications infrastructure of developing nations such as those in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) [15] , [30] , [46] .
The lack of basic telecommunications infrastructure is a severe hindrance to the growth of the information and communications technologies (ICT) in any country [12] , [14] , [26] , [30] . Previous research has associated the level of a country's basic telecommunications infrastructure with its teledensity [11] , [23] , [28] , defined as the number of land telephone lines per 100 people. While telephone lines have been traditionally used for voice communications, in virtually every country of the world, when the market sufficiently matured for such a need, they have eventually formed the national backbone of data communications. Thus, teledensity remains an important indicator of national telecommunications infrastructure. Although the adoption rate of cellular is high in some countries like Nigeria, the diffusion of landlines is still needed to provide the needed backbone connection as well as to provide data transmission services that require high levels of data security. Wireless telephony still suffers from susceptibility of signal interception. Hence, the fiber optic undersea connection, which is in progress throughout Africa will hopefully provide the much needed reliable landline connection working hand-in-hand with existing wireless technologies. Although wireless telecommunications media such as cellular telephony and very small aperture terminal (VSAT) are in the early adoption stage in Africa's Least Developed Economies (LDEs), research-to-date still views landline teledensity as a consistent prerequisite to ICT development [28] .
Africa's LDEs significantly lag behind other regions of the world in terms of teledensity, and with this disadvantage the prospects of catching up with more developed countries in terms of ICT adoption look grim [15] . In all of Africa, there is less than one telephone line per 100 persons for most LDEs within the region [8] , [46] . These figures are substantially lower than even the 2006 figures of nine per 100 in Asia, ten in Latin America and the Caribbean, 37 in Europe, and 66 in the United States [8] . It is only in November 2000, that the East African country, Eritrea, obtained a local Internet connection and finally brought all 54 of Africa's countries and territories online.
Mbarika et al. [47] persuasively put forward four main obstacles to the growth of teledensity in Africa's LDEs. These obstacles, which will be discussed in detail later, include organizational obstacles such as existing governmental monopoly of the telecommunications sector that hinders competition and that results in poor services; financial obstacles such as the unavailability of appropriate funding needed to develop the region's telecommunications infrastructure; technological issues such as lack of the necessary technical expertise to build, operate, and maintain telecommunications-related equipment; and geographical obstacles such as the virtual exclusion of rural regions in Africa, from access to basic telecommunications infrastructure. While Mbarika et al. [47] present these pertinent obstacles, they fall short of suggesting specific strategies to address the dilemma, hence the essence of our current study.
In considering these four obstacles, the first research question is "What strategies can Africa's LDEs adopt to overcome obstacles to telecommunications diffusion?" To address this question, we first search the research literature to determine strategies that had been suggested in overcoming the obstacles. We then asked African governmental and nongovernmental technology stakeholders to rank these strategies to ascertain the best one for overcoming its respective obstacle.
The technology stakeholders in Africa are made up of governmental and nongovernmental stakeholders (NGSH). The governmental stakeholders (GSH) include government and parastatals, and telecommunication operators (government controlled). The NGSH include telecommunication operators (nongovernment controlled), academia, research centers and IT experts, and international/regional organizations. Both the GSH and NGSH have typically played a major role in the implementation of IT at national levels in most developing economies [11] , [29] . However, they have also differed in their approaches to address the telecommunications infrastructure challenges of their countries [14] , [28] .
The differences in stakeholders' perceptions propel us to our second research question: Are there any differences in the perception of strategies between GSH and NGSH? We therefore want to know if there are differences, and if so, what the differences are. If differences exist, it is important to know what they are so that they can be addressed and resolved. Similarly, if there is agreement, then such strategies can be consolidated so as to minimize fragmentation in approaches to address the region's telecommunications dilemma.
The engineering management, information systems, and developmental literature have investigated factors that affect development of telecommunications infrastructure worldwide and specific applications of the same in developing economies [18] , [27] , [28] , [30] , [40] , [44] . Major findings show that telecommunications applications are being acquired and implemented in SSA countries at an exponential rate [4] , [15] , [18] , [21] , [24] , [33] , [48] , [49] . Unfortunately, most of these previous studies have jumped to look at complex applications for developing nations without stepping to understand strategies that address major infrastructure bottlenecks needed to implement sound applications. There is a strong need to understand the contextual settings of the developing economies being studied in order to effectively apply such technologies [31] , [50] .
This exploratory study examines and suggests a comprehensive set of strategies to solve Africa's LDEs growing problems of low telecommunications access (measured in terms of teledensity). We therefore provide an early entry point to study this under-researched and complex region of the world.
II. RESEARCH MOTIVATION
As discussed in the previous section, GSH and NGSH have traditionally suggested different strategies to address the many telecommunications-related problems of their countries. For instance, some stakeholders believe that the telecommunications operator should be a government-controlled monopoly for reasons of national security. Other stakeholders believe that the telecommunications operator should be liberalized to allow for free entry, thereby promoting competition, which will benefit the national economy and improve on the status of telecommunications activity [22] . Some stakeholders--international development organizations-charged with assisting LDEs, regard highly developed telecommunications infrastructure as an urban luxury [7] . On the other hand, academicians have argued on the importance of having universal services in order to close the gap between telecommunications infrastructure of urban and rural areas.
It is therefore clear that technology stakeholders have traditionally gone in different directions while deciding on the best strategies to overcome problems with technological infrastructure for telecommunications in their countries. If we understand how the different stakeholder groups are similar or different in their views of strategies, it is easier to negotiate, compromise, and ultimately get broader based support for strategies. Further, and especially in the case of Africa's LDEs, it is important that these nations not just rush to copy what the more developed West has used as strategies without careful insight on their specific sociocultural and political context. There may be some underlying assumptions in the developed West that may not apply to Africa's LDEs and so context may need to be taken into consideration to define, motivate, and implement such strategies. Our study on teledensity as the basic measure of a nation's telecommunications infrastructure could provide a starting point to stakeholders in Africa's LDEs to catapult strategies for the growth of this very important infrastructure needed for relevant applications.
Teledensity remains a key factor of interest in the developmental potential of Africa's LDEs. First, the telephone infrastructure is the core backbone upon which the region can implement and develop information-age services such as e-commerce, m-commerce, e-medicine, and e-government. Second, it enables and empowers vast number of users to access telephone and Internet-based communication services, such as email, Web browsing, instant messaging, and text messaging, among others. Adequate communications infrastructure enables citizens to access the global resource pools of knowledge, information, finances and markets that empower them to effectively engage in capacity building, income generation, and skills-acquisition activities beneficial to the local communities in which they belong. Third, enhanced teledensity provides the means by which many more citizens can become actively involved in the governance process and contribute effectively to governance issues of the day. As such, enhanced teledensity has the potential for leveraging the quality of governance (World Bank, UNDP, etc.). Fourth, growing teledensity holds the promise of enabling Sub-Saharan countries to effectively and significantly participate in the global financial, securities, and commodities markets. Presently, participation in these highly digitized markets requires extensive levels of high-bandwidth teledensity. Appropriate bandwidth levels still remain a major dream for most LDEs.
Currently, there are 48 LDEs as defined by the United Nations, 33 of which are in Africa. The poor state of telecommunications infrastructure in these LDEs is staggering and has greatly hindered diffusion of related applications that could benefit these nations [11] , [30] . For example, while there are only about two main telephone lines per 100 persons in Africa, such low levels of teledensity are even worse for Africa's LDEs, with less than one telephone line per 100 persons [8] .
III. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
A. Obstacles to Telecommunications Diffusion in Africa's LDEs
Given the tremendous opportunities for LDEs to leverage the potential in telecommunications and related technologies, the question is why are they not doing so? In a recent comprehensive study of telecommunications issues in Africa's LDEs, [47] persuasively put forward several obstacles to the growth of teledensity in the region. These obstacles and supporting literature are as follows.
B. Organizational Obstacles
The regulatory frameworks of some Africa's LDEs such as Ethiopia indicate that the governments still have monopoly power over these countries' telecommunications infrastructure. Access to communications channels is largely controlled by state monopolies. In a World Telecommunications Development Report, the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) points out that a major obstacle to the telephone line penetration in LDEs was that telephone services are provided by monopolized, government-run organizations, limiting the incentives for better performance [46] .
The government monopolies of many LDEs lack basic knowledge of key global trends in information technology [28] . Although the governments of these countries do not directly control the penetration of Internet hosts in these countries, they do have control over the diffusion telephone lines needed for Internet access. Pressure from international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund following the sharp decrease in fiscal revenue forced the public telecommunications monopolies during the 1980s and the 1990s to carry out major reforms. Thus the ICT sector was deregulated as a whole, with the telecommunication industry privatized. Even as some progress is made, the continuously poor quality of service, the lack of even accessibility, and the ridiculously long wait to subscribe and operate a landline are among the factors that constrain the development of telecommunications in Africa today and impact teledensity growth.
C. Financial Obstacles
Africa's LDEs are faced with very weak economic structures. The financial obstacles include low gross domestic product (GDP), low GDP per capita, and insufficient financial autonomy of the operating entities. These financial constraints pose major problems for LDEs that generally have a very low average per capita income of only about US $283 per year. This amount is just 7% of the global average income of US $3980 per year. As evident in other sectors, there is a perpetual scarcity of foreign exchange for private sector investments in the telecommunications sector. This makes the cost of importing computing and telecommunications equipment almost unaffordable. Furthermore, the poor state of the LDEs' banking systems makes it difficult for Africa's LDEs to carry out telecommunications transactions that may necessitate the use of credit cards and other financial-related transactions that require the use of a banking institution [32] .
It is worth noting that many countries in SSA broke away from state control of the economy and liberalized their financial sectors in the late 1980s or 1990s to foster greater managerial efficiency. Despite the new developments and the overall improvement of the economic performance, comparable efforts undertaken in many African countries to restructure the banking system were met with failure. A large proportion of these countries populations are still unable to access banking services, because conventional banking is expensive relatively to their income. The modern, efficiently organized banking sector remains confined to the urban centers, while the rural segment of the population and their financial resources and needs are kept out of the financial intermediating mechanisms. These banks require documentation to open an account, such as proof of income and address, which many lack. Bank fees in Africa are also some of the highest in the world. Without access to a bank account, many persons in Africa are stuck in the informal, cash-only economy.
D. Technological Obstacles
Technological issues are major concerns in providing adequate growth of teledensity in Africa's LDEs; the city of New York or the Tokyo conurbation has more telephone lines than the whole continent of Africa [20] . Because the telephone systems in Africa's LDEs were most likely placed to serve the needs of government, they tended to be confined to major cities. This has left most of the rural population of Africa's LDEs (which is at least 70% of the total population) without any form of telephone access.
As reported in Meso et al. [46] and in Wilson and Wong [43] , LDE's typically use outdated equipment needed to provide the connection lines. The equipment is also inadequately maintained, resulting in poor quality of service and loss of revenues. In some LDEs such as Cameroon, for example, malfunctioning telephone equipment could be out of service for months before a maintenance team arrives to attempt any repairs. Even after problems are identified, the maintenance process is generally slow, partly because the technicians demand bribes.
E. Geographical Obstacles
Various geographical barriers to remote areas as well as lower monetary returns from those areas reduce incentives to extend telecommunications-related infrastructure to those areas. Therefore, most private investors have little or no incentive to establish technology links in rural areas where most of the people live. Such geographical barriers to remote areas are a major problem to most telecommunications-related issues for developing economies in general.
Government monopolies of LDEs lack a universal access policy, which explains why many rural areas do not have any form of telecommunications access [46] . In this paper, we explore the perceptions of technology stakeholders of Africa's LDEs. Using a list of experts from an ITU/UN database, a sample of the stakeholders was asked to rate some telecommunications-related strategies in terms of perceived criticality. We then analyze the data to determine if significant differences in perceptions existed compared to actual trends in the growth of teledensity in recent years.
IV. METHODOLOGY
A. Survey Instrument and Administration
A survey instrument was developed that listed strategies found in the literature. The items for the strategies were derived from a comprehensive review of academic literature and publications of development organizations. The literature review covered a 15-year range and sources searched include ABI INFORM, the Academic Search Elite (EBSCO Host) databases, and a "Bibliography of Telecommunications and Socio-Economic Development." Additionally, emails were sent to two major list-serves-ISWORLD and AFRIK-IT. These listserves involved members of IT community worldwide involved in research and industry in the area of IT in Africa. The email requested for members of the list-serves to provide the authors with references in the area of strategies to overcome obstacles to telecommunications infrastructure in Africa's LDEs or contacts of individuals that could help.
The academic literature was peer-reviewed journals and major conference proceedings that focused on IT for socioeconomic development. Other major academic publications used for this work are books written and published in the subject area of telecommunications for socio-economic development. The items for the survey questionnaire were developed using a scale from one (strongly disagree) to seven (strongly agree) to the agreement of the set of strategies for each obstacle. The respondents were provided the opportunity to also provide comments on how they felt about the suggested strategies. Some of the comments are included in the Section VI of this paper.
A pilot test of the questionnaire was conducted by randomly selecting participants from the list provided by the ITU. However, participants were unaware of their role in the pilot test. This pilot test involved 15 participants. We asked the stakeholders to give comments on the understandability of the items for the different strategies. Questions that were unclear were corrected to make them more meaningful while certain redundant questions were thrown out of the survey. This resulted in a revised survey instrument that was used to collect data for the full survey.
The full survey was administered to the aforementioned technology stakeholders who were given the option of using traditional paper-based or Web-based technologies. These respondents (stakeholders) were selected from the same ITU list as those who participated in the pilot survey. The issue of any potential response bias, based on our use of Web-based data collection, was very minimal since these stakeholders have access to and use the Internet, fax, and most telecommunicationsbased technologies. An important aspect of data collection is that all techniques have differing advantages and disadvantages.
Researchers have argued for the use of multimethod approaches for data collection [2] , [45] . Also, many researchers have argued for the importance of Web-based survey in improving response time while still sustaining the reliability and validity of data (e.g., [1] , [16] ). Respondents using the paper questionnaires were provided a fax number to use in order to return the survey. Respondents could also simply mail back the survey.
We offered the respondents a little incentive if they completed the survey. To this, we gave them an option to request for a free summary report of our research findings. Most of the respondents did request for the report. A summary of items (questions) used in the survey are presented in Tables I-IV. V. RESULTS Of the 212 questionnaires sent to individuals, 105 responses were returned, which corresponds to a response rate of 49.5%. We were limited to this sample size because our target sample included participants (stakeholders) that had a significant level of control over their specific institutions (for the NGSH), ministries, governmental subdepartments, or organizations (for GSHs). It is our understanding that this is a high rate, especially when compared to results from other surveys and studies. Of the 105 technology stakeholders, 58 were GSHs and 47 were NGSH. Description of the various respondents is given in Table V. A. Scale Assessment 1) Factor Analysis: An exploratory factor analysis (EFA) approach was conducted to explore groups of strategies. EFA was used as a validity check to make sure that the items did indeed measure the underlying latent variables that we had identified from theory. Nonparametric tests, such as the Friedman test, can be used on interval data. We used the Friedman's test to perform the rank orders of Africa's stakeholders' perceptions. The Friedman test is the nonparametric equivalent of the analysis of variance (ANOVA) for repeated measures. Nonparametric tests are used when assumptions for parametric tests are not met. Those assumptions might include normal distribution and a large enough sample size. We, therefore, used the nonparametric equivalent of ANOVA because of the small sample size in some of the groups in the analyses. The criterion used for the factor analysis was the percentage of variance criterion. This criterion requires interpretation of the cumulative percentage of variance accounted for by the factor solution. The factors explaining a small percentage of the variance are deemed to be of little practical significance. In the social sciences it is common to consider a satisfactory solution as one that accounts for 60% of the total variance. The values of the Eigenvalues and percentage of variance indicate that it may be possible to factor the constructs to a smaller set of factors that could explain the phenomenon under study (Table VI) .
From the results mentioned earlier, it can be observed that the first seven factors accounted for more than 60% of the variance (Table VI) . The Eigenvalues for the first seven factors were greater than or equal to 1 (Table VI) . Hence, the seven factors TABLE III  DESCRIPTIONS OF FACTORS UNDER FINANCIAL-ORIENTED STRATEGY   TABLE IV  DESCRIPTIONS OF FACTORS UNDER GEOGRAPHICAL-ORIENTED STRATEGY in each case could be used to summarize the groups of strategies [5] . Table VII presents the factor loadings and Table VIII presents groupings of strategies.
2) Naming the Factors: Given the factor loadings in Table VII , the authors did the following to name the factors 1) We revisited the literature to see possible names that could closely explain the items that loaded under each corresponding factor. 2) Given that several possible factor names emerged from the literature, the authors brainstormed and carefully examined the wordings of each item under the corresponding factors. From the brainstorming, we chose factor names from the literature that most closely explained the items.
3) With further review by nonauthors of the paper, we refined and emerged with the factor names listed in Table VIII . 3) Reliability: Cronbach's alphas were computed for all items together and for each factor under all seven dimensions of strategies that emerged from our EFA: Investment in ICTs, Wireless and Satellite Infrastructure, Government Policy, Government Regulation, Building Local Capacity, Privatization, and Policy/Regulation (Table IX) .
The generally agreed upon lower limit for Cronbach's alpha is 0.60 [34] ; hence, we believed six out of the seven factors were suitable to use in our study. Essentially, these values provided evidence of internal consistency among their respective items.
We classify these variables as reflective factors instead of formative since the items that make each one up are highly related to each other and the overall factors have high reliability. This is obvious from our EFA and our Cronbach's alpha test. The items for the factors seem to share a common theme, and dropping one item in a factor does not seem to alter the conceptual domain of the factor. The items in each factor are expected to covary with each other.
Given the evidence of internal consistency, we proceeded to investigate the rank order of the remaining six strategies so that we can have a sense of how the African Stakeholders perceived their impact. The section that follows presents our findings from the rank order, using Friedman's Test.
B. Results from Rank Order of Six Strategies
Mean value and standard deviation were computed for each factor. The results of the rank order of the means revealed that the "investment in ICT" factor was ranked the highest, followed by the "Wireless and Satellite Infrastructure" factor. The "Privatization" factor was ranked the lowest. Table X shows the rank orders of the mean scores for the six factors.
C. Differences of Perceptions
Our second research question is to determine whether there exist any differences in the perceptions of GSH as compared to NGSH. Since in our research question we are only concerned about differences between GSH and NGSH, we ran an ANOVA on all six strategies to see differences between both groups and not between the affiliations. From the analyses, we found that stakeholders differed in their perception on three out of the six strategies.
We observe that there is a significant difference in stakeholders' perceptions of the strategies. As a result of this, stakeholders did differ in their perceptions depending on whether they were GSH or NGSH. The result of the ANOVA for the effect of Group is shown in Table XI. Compared to the NGSH, the GSH were stronger in their perception of the factors "Investment in ICTs," "Government Policy," and "Building Local Capacity." For the "Investment in ICTs" factor, the mean for the GSH and NGSH was 6.19 and 5.80, respectively; for the "Government Policy" factor, the means for the GSH and NGSH was 5.24 and 4.72, respectively; and for the "Building Local Capacity" factor, the mean for the GSH and NGSH was 6.15 and 5.52, respectively (see Table XII ).
VI. DISCUSSION
Although the rank order reveal that some factors were ranked much higher than others, it is worth noting that all six factors that emerged from our EFA had relatively high mean values. This shows that the stakeholders felt strongly about the strategies. For that reason, we will discuss all six factors in the section that follows and also discuss the differences in perceptions as revealed through the ANOVA results.
A. Investment in ICTs
This strategy was ranked highest. Investment in ICTs is undoubtedly a cornerstone for telecommunication growth in any country [26] , [32] . A major problem in Africa's LDEs is low level of investment and skepticism on the part of locals and foreign investors, respectively. Foreign investors fear putting their resources at risk. As for the locals, there is an apprehension in taking risk (an inevitable characteristic of investment). These findings conform to other findings in existing literature for developing economies in general. Maddy [19] identified two breeds of investors for LDEs: Do-Gooders and Do-Wellers. Do-Gooders are investors and lenders that are typically quasigovernment agencies (though some are multinational banks) that provide equity capital and loan capital for ostensibly idealistic purposes; generating economic prosperity in emerging-market countries and stimulating further influx of capital from other investors. They generally do not embrace the fundamental idea of reward for risk that underlies entrepreneurship. "The do-good" venture capitalists are staffed with career bureaucrats who stand to gain nothing if their agencies' investments do well. Do-Wellers are the classic, hungry, "show me the money" investors, who believe business is a high-stakes game. They may like worthy causes, but "doing good" is not a major concern. They are generally savvy financiers who understand that high risk is needed for high returns.
In highly ranking investment in ICTs, the stakeholders contend that Africa's LDEs should follow the Do-Wellers' approach. In order to do this, the Africa's LDEs should encourage private investment through the reorganization of the telecommunication sector and by using policy to direct investment into the sector. Such an approach will encourage entrepreneurism in 1 The rank order of each category of strategies was evaluated using Friedman's Test [56, p 271] . This is a more direct evaluation of the investigator's research question or hypothesis that involves the association of the ranks. Friedman's test therefore tests the null hypothesis that k related variables come from the same population. For each case, the k variables are ranked from 1 to k. The test statistic is based on these ranks. Each case is a judge or rater and each variable is an item or person being judged. In this case, each stakeholder was a rater of each factor (strategy) and its associated items. The null hypothesis states that there is no difference in mean ranks (the sum of ranks divided by the number of cases) of the stakeholders' perceptions while the alternative hypothesis states that a difference exists in the mean ranks of the stakeholders perceptions. The test statistic for the Friedman's test is a Chi-square (χ 2 ) with a − 1 degrees of freedom (d.f.), where "a" is the number of repeated measures. When the P -value (Significance) for this test is small (usually <0.05) you have evidence to reject the null hypothesis. the technology sector, which is the basic philosophy behind the Do-Wellers' approach.
Second, the stakeholders say that these countries should encourage the participation of foreign private investors in funding projects directed towards growth of technological infrastructure for telecommunication diffusion in Africa's LDEs. Countries such as Eritrea and Somalia have the major challenge of attracting capital by restructuring their telecommunication sector. Africa's LDEs must create an environment to attract private investors. A stakeholder commented:
I think we have a lot of local investors with the capital to invest but if the right investment environment is not created, not even the foreign investors will invest. If the right environment is created, preference should be given to the local private investor than the foreign investor.
Several African countries have taken the extra step to encourage private investment in telecommunication services. Examples include Botswana, The Gambia, and Tunisia. These countries have experienced tremendous growth in telecommunication usage at the rate of 15% and above per year.
Africa's LDEs, with assistance of funding organizations, should set up long-term contracts to buy new knowledge from developed countries, that is, advocate for joint ventures. Also, development organizations should conduct seminars to improve the qualifications of experts of Africa's LDEs. Such an alliance could be the basis of a (long-term) transition to greater selfsufficiency with less dependence on foreign countries.
The stakeholders argue that countries and international agencies with development assistance programs should give higher priority to growth of telecommunication in Africa' LDEs. Also, funding institutions must ease conditions to grant loans for the purpose of establishing basic technological infrastructure in Africa's LDEs. Related to this factor, the ITU has set up a private sector driven by a multinational and development funding organization called WorldTel. This organization focuses exclusively on the development of telecommunication and IT in LDEs. WorldTel provides client LDEs with direct equity investment acquired from private financial investors in the world and coordinate project finance, from debt and equity coming from governments, telecommunication operators, and manufacturers. It also helps client countries improve their policies and management practices. A stakeholder cautions on continuous dependence on foreign donors:
Concerning the issue of donor inflows to the telecom (sector) we must be very careful with the conditions attached to the terms of the grant. . ..
It is crucial to mention that, the ability of a lagging country to absorb the more advanced technologies is dependent on its social capacity, which involves various aspects of the country's development process. Technological catching-up is often associated with innovative activities such as R&D and patenting. On the other hand, capital investment is necessary to import the more advanced technology that is embodied in the new equipment. Besides innovation and investment, the level of education also plays a crucial role in determining the technical competence of the labor force. Also, SSA countries should develop the factors required to attract foreign direct investment in adequate match with foreign companies' strategies. Policies supporting the national systems of innovation and encouraging technology diffusion are capital to this end, because they contribute to the creation of assets.
The stakeholders also encourage other financial and investment strategies such as the push for investors to establish telecommunication services in rural areas and other underserved communities. They encourage investments such as establishing public telecommunications access (telecenters). Note that this is an extremely important strategy for most LDEs as these countries are generally about 70% rural. Investors have typically ignored these rural areas for the sake of profit in urban areas. However, as of January 2007, there have been reports of unprecedented surges in demand for telecommunication services in rural areas. Investors can greatly benefit from such a surge and also help the neglected communities get connected to the rest of the world [30] .
B. Wireless and Satellite Infrastructure
An excited Edwin Ireri smiled broadly as he handled his first mobile phone. For the first time in his life, the Kenya Railways inspector could now communicate with his bosses, employees and family at will. Ireri knows the cell phone will change his life but doesn't quite grasp how people like him are changing the nature of the telecom industry. [39] .
This statement represents a phenomenon reminiscent of many success stories vis-à-vis the exponential growth in multiple dimensions of wireless telecommunication infrastructure in Africa's LDEs. It is also good news to many foreign investors now flooding the region with new businesses that would have otherwise been difficult to establish and run without the appropriate telecommunication infrastructure.
By ranking the wireless and satellite infrastructure factor very high, the stakeholders believe that in order to overcome the geographical-oriented obstacles, Africa's LDEs should install mobile satellite services and fixed cellular networks. In essence, the use of satellites would provide faster and broader telecommunication access in Africa's LDEs due to the ubiquitous coverage offered by satellite technology [26] . Also, wireless and satellite infrastructure in this context includes the use of semifixed analog mobile phone cells placed in communities without telecommunication access and a VSAT link to regional hubs.
The implementation of cellular telephony to create wireless local loops, as an alternative to wired systems, is receiving increasingly favorable reviews, especially in developing economies. The reasons are compelling dramatically lower line cost, improved reliability, and greatly enhanced flexibility. Developing economies in South East Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America are increasingly turning to cellular to provide basic telephone services. There are predictions that basic telephony will migrate to cellular and other advanced wireless technologies, while legacy wired systems would be dedicated for data services. Furthermore, with advanced cellular technology, people can do various electronic market transactions using their cellular phones, as is the case in most Scandinavian countries. Some stakeholders expressed skepticism. For example, one among the skeptics commented:
Wireless communication is the order of the day so I think we should pursue it because of the advantages it has over the wire system. I also think we should give preference to digital technology since it has advantages over the analog system.
While we can speak of the utility of wireless technology, the unresolved question is how to bring this technology to the average citizen of an Africa's LDEs-not forgetting the provision of such services in rural areas. A couple of the stakeholders had these to say:
Though I strongly agree on the suggested approaches above (the adoption of wireless technologies), one thing I'll like to point out is the cost factor. We are actually in a dilemma. It's a waste, to install complex wireless communication systems in some rural areas, where they are very underutilized, but at the same time, we want to ensure that those in the rural areas can communicate without such complex systems. If the resources were available, those in the rural areas would most likely opt for some other thing; such as; electricity, water, hospitals, schools, etc.
All the suggested options (the adoption of wireless technologies) may solve the problem, but this is subject to the pricing of the service.
Although teledensity has traditionally only regarded landbased telephone lines, with the rapid adoption of wireless telecommunications' media such as cellular telephony and VSAT, this concept will need to be expanded to include other measures of telecommunications intensity. The research to date has almost exclusively employed the traditional measurement that considered only landlines. Traditional teledensity counts the number of landlines, whereas a contemporary calculation would consider each mobile telephone subscription to be a wireless "line." While Africa's LDEs' landline teledensity doubled from 0.4 lines per 100 citizens in 1991 to 0.9 per 100 in 2002, the mobile teledensity moved from virtually zero in 1991 to 1.9 mobile phone subscriptions per 100 citizens in 2002. Many of these are digital connections, which pave the way for access to ICT in countries where most citizens cannot afford personal computers. Today, wireless communications seems more relevant than wired means for the development of Africa's LDEs' data communications networks.
Wireless telecommunications infrastructure-once the preserve of the rich Western elite-is permeating the world's poorest countries, where they are least expected. The African continent has become one of the world's biggest birthing grounds for the wireless telephone industry. By the end of 2004, over two-thirds of the region's countries had more mobile than fixed subscribers; a higher percentage than any other continent (International Telecommunications Union, 2004). Africa's LDEs accounts for a teledensity of about 0.79 and a mobile density 2 of 1.13.
The number of mobile subscribers in 30 Africa's LDEs rose from zero in 1996 to over 51 million in late 2004. The rate of growth for the entire continent has been more than 82% a year, much faster than 33% growth rate in the Americas. In many countries, such as Cameroon, Kenya, Senegal, and Tanzania, annual cellular growth rates are running in excess of 300%. Furthermore, the total number of cellular phone users still remains very low although the rate/rhythm of adoption is high. The rate/rhythm of adoption of an innovation can be defined as the speed to which it is adopted within a given population and it is measured by number of individuals per unit of time [35] .
These wireless technologies are tremendously contributing to the economic development of Africa's LDEs to improve delivery of education through tele-education [24] ; improvement of commerce through m-commerce [12] , [26] ; and delivery of healthcare through e-medicine [14] , [38] . These instrumental uses of the mobile phone represent ways in which mobile phones, in low-teledensity settings, are operated in manners normally attributed to landlines. Thus, wireless communications seem to be an excellent alternative to landlines, and a major contribution to the resolution of teledensity problems in Africa's LDEs.
C. Government Policy
With the Government Policy strategy, the stakeholders promote privatization to go hand-in-hand with nongovernmental regulation, which involves establishing an impartial, nongovernmental regulatory body to control the telecommunications industry. This also involves establishing an impartial, nongovernmental regulatory body to set and uphold standards within the telecommunications industry. Such a move may reduce the level of corruption that already exists within the regulatory sector (governmental) that currently exists in most LDEs. There may, however, be some telecommunications competition and universal coverage concerns that may need some level of government regulation. These are discussed in the next section under the "Government Regulation" factor. Also, the stakeholders concurred that a good strategy would be to mandate that new service providers serve both urban and rural areas, using resources of urban areas to subsidize rural areas and also extend their turnover and employment opportunities for the broader populace of these nations. The stakeholders also encouraged pooling purchases of commonly used equipment including terminals and components in a bid to save costs of equipment purchase. While this does not sound bad, the challenge is to get African LDEs to agree on basic issues. However, as of June 2007, some African LDEs started to reorganize themselves in economic zones so as to share resources such as those involved in telecommunications. One of such zones is the East African Community that includes the nations of Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and more recently the previously war torn nations of Burundi and Rwanda. In a recent visit by one of the coauthors to Rwanda, signs of progress in telecommunications were very apparent for both landlines and wireless infrastructures. In fact Rwanda is one of the few African countries with its own Internet exchange point, which will eventually be shared by other members of the East African Community of nations. Although these East African nations are not necessarily rich in natural resources, they are strongly encouraging growth of their service sectors, in terms of tourism especially. This is acting as a strong catalyst to the growth of telecommunication of these nations so as to attract more tourists.
D. Government Regulation
The stakeholders strongly encourage government regulation. With this factor, the stakeholders strongly feel that in addition to nongovernmental regulation (discussed in the previous section), there should be a corresponding level of governmental regulation to direct some aspects of the telecommunications industry and to uphold standards set within the industry. This helps create the necessary checks and balances needed for fair play in the telecommunications sector. Just as governments have abused power in these LDEs, leaving the telecommunications industry entirely in private hands may lead to acute abuse of power by the big name investors (usually from foreign countries), hence killing the average small scale investors (usually the locals). Converse to the case of developed nations where the "little guy" can sue the "big guy" and have their voices heard in court, LDEs do not really have strong legal systems to allow for that. Even more important, regulation enables the government to impose strict laws about universal service, especially when private investors get involved in the telecommunications sector. Typically these investors will not want to establish a presence in rural areas in Africa's LDE, given that services in such areas are hardly profitable. However, most Africa's LDEs have about 70% of their population in rural areas. Government regulations to push private telecommunications investors to establish a presence in these rural regions will provide a platform for the rural populace to reach out to other parts of their country and the world. For example, farmers in these areas will be able to communicate with clients in the urban parts of the country providing new outlets to sell their produce. This is already happening in Cameroon where wireless (cell) towers have been established in rural areas [30] . Most of these areas have never had a single landline but today communications is very possible through wireless loops due to government regulations that have pushed local and foreign investors to establish a wireless presence in the rural regions (usually as a condition for the government to grant wireless operating licenses).
E. Building Local Capacity
The International Development Research Center (IDRC) pointed to the overdependence of most Africa's LDEs on foreign technicians and consultants in the maintenance of technological infrastructure and the development and enactment of key telecommunications policy guidelines, respectively [23] . The IDRC notes that this has contributed to the formulation of policies that do not adequately address the real needs of these countries. Thus, the need to utilize and further develop the capacities of local technical experts in the field of telecommunications is of prime importance to the chances of creating sustainable development.
Africa's LDEs should review the possibilities for local or regional manufacturers of telecommunications-related equipment, and that operators and manufacturers should enhance the training opportunities they offer to telecommunications-related staff of Africa's LDEs. Furthermore, Africa's LDEs should be trained to carry out monthly routine maintenance of already existing equipment.
Regarding local manufacturing, one of the strategies that have accelerated growth of telecommunications in Indonesia is the promotion of local industries. In fact, Indonesia began to export other telecommunications-related products. Local manufacturing capability would ensure rapid development of telecommunications-related services in LDEs [46] . This could be a step to remove Africa's LDEs from their current overdependence on foreign countries.
Further, African LDEs should review the possibilities for local or regional manufactures of telecommunications equipment, and that operators and manufacturers should enhance the training opportunities they offer to telecommunications staff of these countries. Locals should be trained to carry out monthly routine maintenance of already existing equipment. Two stakeholders commented:
I think this issue of the foreign countries helping us should be in the short term since they have it now and we must learn and be able to start doing it on our own and become independent.
Training should be an integral part of any equipment installation replacement. Foreign experts should be used to assist in the process and assist in contract specifications.
The stakeholders strongly discourage any form of total foreign dependency. Essentially, Africa's LDEs should not always rush to hire foreign experts to perform routine maintenance of already existing equipment. Overdependency on foreign experts has been the trend in most Africa's LDEs [23] . Furthermore, the preference for foreign experts is symptomatic of the lack of confidence of African technical experts, administrators, and policy-makers in their own (national) professionals.
Concerning total foreign dependency, one stakeholder had the following to say:
The problem of African countries is mainly the transfer of technology and know-how to their nationals. 'Black-box' moving and dependency on expatriates to do the maintenance will not help to develop the necessary know-how among the nationals for the development and maintenance of the systems, this expertise that won't be affected by the local conditions in African countries of poverty or other unfavorable conditions and won't fly away under the first sign of political turbulence. Thus, I believe in the importance of transfer of technology and know-how to nationals as a step towards sustainable development, and I also believe that intra-African co-operation can lead to better results in negotiating the transfer of technology.
The apprehension towards total foreign dependency was even more interesting when compared to the high ranking for investments in ICTs (which largely includes foreign investments). The African stakeholders are essentially saying to the West "we need your money, but not your control of the technology industries."
F. Privatization
Looking at the fairly high means for the privatization factor, the stakeholders are essentially saying that the telecommunications operators that provide telecommunications connectivity should be turned into an independent company with complete autonomy, and that shares of the telecommunications operator should be sold to the public. Furthermore, the stakeholders believe that Africa's LDEs should encourage competition among the telecommunications operators as a major step to solve the organizational-oriented obstacles. As far back as the 70s, Littlechild [17] stated that private ownership was positively correlated to a country's growth in most dimensions of its telecommunications sector. In support of that theory, the number of lines available for telecommunications connectivity significantly increased in Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Malaysia after privatization [23] . Similar results to boost telecommunications in LDEs could be expected if privatization is followed in these countries.
Privatization therefore seems to be a major factor under the organizational-oriented strategy. A stakeholder explained it like this:
Privatization is one important step to combat organizational and policy-oriented obstacles. Private companies operate in competition, and service quality is bound to be high. However, given that privatization strips most powers off the monopolistic state machinery in some countries, it is not surprising that there is a lot of resistance to this option. It is not an exaggeration to say that one can find a stateowned enterprise with a very high running cost, yet this enterprise cannot be privatized. And even when it is done, it's probably not being done in a transparent manner. Nevertheless, given the global trends of business activities, privatization would be understood in the long run.
Privatization of the technological infrastructure sector has greatly improved the levels of telecommunications activity in several developing economies such as the Philippines, Chile, and South Africa. Within Africa's LDEs there exist several examples of how privatization of the sector improved the levels of telecommunications access. For example, in Botswana, separation of the Public Telecommunication Operator (the Botswana Telecommunications Corporation) from the State in 1980 accounted for a teledensity of 3.1 lines per 100 people, the third highest in Africa's LDEs. The technological network has grown at a rate of 20% per year since 1987. More and more people and businesses in Botswana now have telecommunications access. In The Gambia, one of the reasons for its success is that the process of "corporatization," or separation of the operator from the state, took place relatively early [20] . The main telecommunications access provider, GAMTEL, was established as a private limited company under the Companies Act in March 1998. As such, The Gambia has found it easier than other telecommunications operators supporting telecommunications activities in Africa to attract funds for investment [20] .
G. Differences in Perceptions Between GSH (Internal) and NGSH (External)
There are significant differences between the strength of response of GSH as compared to NGSH in the areas of Investment in ICT, Government policy, and Building Local Capacity. GSH seem to pay great attention on these factors than NGSH. We believe these differences are related to GSH' role, which is to provide a vision, a strategy, and an enabling environment to develop the national information and communication infrastructure within their countries.
Earlier in the paper, we presented Table XI (ANOVA) and  Table XII (descriptive statistics) to show the difference between these two groups of stakeholders. For the "Investment in ICTs" factor, the mean for the GSH and NGSH was 6.19 and 5.80, respectively. The GSH feel stronger than the NGSH in attracting investors for their telecommunications sector. This was kind of surprising as one would expect the reverse. However, these governments have come to realize after about 40 years of independence from the "West" that they are strictly limited in resources to be able to control the telecommunications sector by only using their meager resources. Hence they are turning to private investors. With the wind of democracy sweeping the African region, many of the newly elected governments are creating the environment needed for investors to feel comfortable and secure to invest in these countries.
For the "Government Policy" factor, the means for the GSH and NGSH were 5.24 and 4.72, respectively. Here, the GSH feel even stronger than the NGSH in having some level of involvement in the telecommunications sector so as to ensure fair game in the competitive field of telecommunications. Further, these GSH want to strongly push for rural telecommunication development through establishing a universal assess policy to cater for their largely rural populace. While NGSH seemingly encourage some level of governmental intervention, they seem to strongly want the competition game to go as the profitability goes; not necessarily putting particular emphasis to developing rural telecommunications.
As for the "Building Local Capacity" factor, the mean for the GSH and NGSH was 6.15 and 5.52, respectively. Again the GSH felt much stronger about this factor than the NGSH. Similar to the "Investment in ICTs" factor, the GSH have come to realize the need to build local capacity and not for them to try to do all the work. We believe we would have had a different reaction from the GSH if we had performed this research 10-15 years ago when most of the governments were mainly dictatorial, controlling almost every sector of the economies of these nations. Today, most African LDEs are seeking aid from the "West" not in terms of money mainly but in terms of training locals. Hence, some countries such as Cameroon have a governmental policy of tax relief for educational institutions so as to encourage local capacity building. This has resulted in plethora of tertiary institutions of training in the information technology and telecommunications area. Many of these institutions in Africa have created alliances with US and European technology companies such as Microsoft and Cisco; hence, offering certifications from these world-renowned companies.
VII. RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS
Over the years Africa has been portrayed as a problematic continent in almost every aspect of social, economic, and political life. The world in general and the news media in particular have found it to be very interesting to talk about Africa's problems. However, very little has been done in the way of finding applicable solutions for these problems. Unfortunately, the same seems to apply in the academic community.
In effect, the results could assist governments and large international ICT coordination agencies in their search for a solution to build an information-based society. An information-based society is often defined as a world in which everyone has the possibility to create, obtain, use, and share information and knowledge, and in which individuals, communities, and populations can realize the totality of their potential and make long-lasting improvements in their quality of life. New information and communication make possible instant exchanges of information and the realization of ground-breaking applications, for example, in the fields of public administration, commerce, education, and health care to name a few.
In order to attain a true information-based society and permit the Africa's LDEs to profit from opportunities offered by communications technologies, it is important to understand the strategies for their development. This study has allowed us to define the relevant strategies, which could be leveraged for more efficiency and effectiveness. The study thus suggested strategies as well as an alternative solution, namely wireless communication to overcome the low teledensity problem.
The results of this study indicate that the governments and the organizations concerned with the promotion of the telecommunications sector in SSA should take into account the divergent interests of the stakeholders concerned when formulating and implementing their policies. They should also support and develop mobile communications, which, from all indications, seems to have found a great response in urban as well as rural African populations. We believe this will surely contribute to the universal access to communications services, particularly with the prospects of the new applications described previously. Moreover, telecommunications policies should find the incentives needed to attract foreign investment in support of the privatization in this sector; for example, in partnerships between foreign companies with proven expertise in the area and national investors.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Several attempts in the engineering management literature to investigate technology transfer, diffusion, and adoption at the national, organizational, and individual levels have yielded interesting, albeit different findings [9] , [13] , [18] , [30] , [37] . We attempt to study these differences and similarities by integrating theory with practitioners' insights of viable strategies, so as to develop our understanding of this under-researched topic and region of the world.
The findings of this study can be used to provide prescriptive directions to policy-makers of Africa's LDEs and development agencies who are in charge of improving telecommunications access in these countries. These policy-makers and development agencies can explore and analyze the strategies mentioned earlier as well as examples of countries that have used similar strategies to improve on their levels of telecommunications activities. This can be done considering that certain developing economies that were once LDEs, both large and small in size, have been able to establish high quality telecommunications services as well as some developed countries, despite their poor economic conditions. ACKNOWLEDGMENT Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.
